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Introduction
A growing body of literature has documented signi…cant market price movements following the release of macroeconomic announcements across most major asset markets. It has not surprisingly been documented that …nan-cial markets react to the unanticipated news component in these releases.
The use of accurate measures for market expectations, which per de…ni-tion measure the anticipated news component, is therefore crucial in any study exploring the market impact of macroeconomic releases. The existing literature on macroeconomic announcements has traditionally measured the surprise content of a given release as the di¤erence between the actual release and published survey expectations. However, these survey expectations are not perfect.
Gauging market expectations by static survey measures does seem prone to induce measurement errors for the unanticipated news component for at least two reasons. Firstly, the survey expectation are typically polled over several days before the announcement. Secondly, the typical respondents are investment banks research units and other researchers, but rarely actual traders. Hence any new information may not have been taken into account by all respondents and the expectation may di¤er between traders, who set the price, and market analysts. Consequently, the lack of survey expectations that are dynamically updated and conducted among actual traders may lead to di¤erences between actual market expectations and survey measures. This paper adopts a market-based expectation measure, which is based on a theoretical market microstructure model. The model indicates that the information contained in the order ‡ow prior to release of macroeconomic announcements should be taken into account. Speci…cally, if …nancial market prices re ‡ect additional information beyond what is contained in survey expectations, this is likely to be re ‡ected in price movements prior to releases.
These price movements may re ‡ect expectation adjustments taking place.
The theoretical model allows a formalization of the linkages between price movements prior and after announcement. In addition, two important testable implications of the theoretical model are derived. Firstly, it proposes a test of whether an expectations adjustment does take place. Secondly, a market-based expectation measure can be derived, which can be compared with the survey measures.
The empirical evidence presented in this paper con…rm that expectations adjustments are actually taking place. The price movements prior to release are statistical signi…cant for the most important releases, that is for the US announcements of non-farm payroll and the ISM manufacturing survey and the German IFO and ZEW indicators. The fact that expectations adjustment only can be con…rmed for the most important releases suggests that the costs related to information search therefore must exceed a minimum gain.
The information search and active position taking thereby only appears to take place for those announcements with the highest pro…t potential.
The market-based expectation measure does not give lower forecast errors, but captures the directionality better. The measure is therefore somewhat better at forecasting whether the surprise is positive or negative. Hence adopting a market-based measure appear to give more noisy measures, as these tend to over-and undershoot more often. All in all, the market-based measure outperforms static survey measures as directionality is captured somewhat better, probably because it allows for dynamic updating of expectations among actual traders.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 takes a look at the related literature. In section 2, a standard theoretical market microstructure model along the lines of Hellwig (1980) explains how prices and expectations around macroeconomic announcements interact in a theoretical setting. Section 3 examines the issue empirically. Speci…cally section 3.1 discusses the data and the considerations about formulating a test that builds on the theoretical framework in section 2. Section 3.2 tests whether market prices contain information about the expectations of upcoming macroeconomic announcements. This is done in a standard event study model. In section 3.3 a measure for market-adjusted expectations for the macroeconomic announcements is derived and forecast errors are compared with standard survey expectation measures. Section 4 concludes.
Related literature
The event studies on macroeconomic releases, such as Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) , Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) , all …nd signi…cant market reactions to macroeconomic releases. However, as Rigobon and Sack (2006) note, the response coe¢ cients appear rather small and only to a lesser extent explain the market movements around releases. This suggests that other factors around releases are at a play. Rigobon and Sack (2006) explain this by poor survey quality data, which can be attributed to issues such as time lag and surveys being analyst expectations rather than market participant expectations. In addition they note that the "true" macroeconomic news in a given release is not necessarily given by actual releases, as actual releases are a noisy signals of the underlying news.
The explanation of Rigobon and Sack (2006) is in part examined by Campbell and Sharpe (2007) , who show that behavioral biases may exist in surveys. Speci…cally they show that surveys are centered around the actual release of the previous month and that this anchoring bias in some cases result in sizable forecast errors. Hence they con…rm the poor survey quality. Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006) consider improved expectation measures.
They use the market for macroeconomic derivatives to derive measures of market expectations and show that macroeconomic derivatives provides more accurate estimates of actual market outcomes. Again con…rming the apparent lacks of existing survey measures.
A more theoretically appealing approach is given in Hautsch and Hess (2007) and Hautsch, Hess, and Müller (2007) . They …nd that the price impact is signi…cantly stronger with higher-precision information, as predicted by Bayesian learning models, on applications on US employment announcements. They show this by including a richer information set and hence improve the di¤ering value/precision of the individual release. Consequently they show that additional information beyond the actual release probably also plays an important role.
In a similar Bayesian spirit Andersson, Ejsing, and von Landesberger (2007) use the information content of previously announced, but related releases, extracted through Kalman …ltering, to derive more precise expectation measures. They consequently show the importance of learning from previous releases. This paper also implements a Bayesian motivated approach by adopting a standard market microstructure approach. However, the approach di¤ers in one important aspect. Instead of using a richer information set, for instance from similar announcements, this paper uses the information contained in prices.
Model
The interaction between price movements before and after announcement releases can be illustrated in a standard market microstructure model, in which prices re ‡ect information conveyed by the trade actions of informed investors. The model is speci…ed to resemble the typical econometric set-up used in macroeconomic event studies. Consequently the empirical results later in this paper can be directly linked to the theoretical model implications.
The chosen speci…cation originates from Hellwig (1980) . However, the exact implementation is based on Vives (2008) , section 4.2. Some changes have however been introduced, so the chosen speci…cation is better suited at understanding the pricing mechanics surrounding macroeconomic releases.
The mode builds on market e¢ ciency principle: The trade actions of informed investors in part or fully reveals their private information. However, the model departs in one crucial assumption. The market expectations of the outcome of the macroeconomic release is based on a linear updating rule instead of using conditional expectations. This implies that the expectations of the market participants may not be fully rational, but captures noise in their expectation formation. The use of a plausible linear updating rule for expectations introduces correlation between market expectations and the actual realization of the macroeconomic release.
We consider a two-period model with a single risky asset and a riskless and interest free borrowing/lending asset, with rational investors and noise traders. There is a continuum of investors indexed in the interval i 2 [0; 1] with CARA-type utility functions, U ( i ) = exp i , that participate in the market together with noise traders.
The investors utility is a function of pro…ts, i = (p t p t 1 )x i , which naturally depends on prices p t 1 and p t in respectively the …rst period, t 1; and the second period, t, in addition to their position in the risky asset x i .
As usual, > 0 is the constant risk aversion coe¢ cient. The noise traders demand a stochastic amount u of the risky asset, where u N (0; 1= u ).
In the …rst period, t 1, the outcome of some event is realized, but not made publicly available before period t. We assume N ( v; 1= ), where we may informally call v the survey expectation, which is the a priori or unconditional expectation about the event. is a measure of the uncertainty related to the outcome.
All investors receive private signals about the outcome of the event at time t 1. Their signal, s i = +" i is a noisy measure of the actual outcome of as " i N (0; 1= " ). " measures the precision of the signal. Based on the unconditional expectation and their private signal, the investors optimize their utility and thereby make their investment decision x i .
At period t, the realization of is announced and prices are determined.
The pricing dynamic in this model is assumed to be given by
The price depends on the non-anticipated information from the event multiplied by some coe¢ cient . The anticipated information/market expectation is denoted byṽ, which may di¤er from the survey expectation v. Note we have normalized prices of the intrinsic value of the asset to be 0 and solely let the price depend on the outcome of the event and market expectations. Prices can therefore be interpreted as returns, which will be done later in the empirical part.
The market expectation,ṽ, is formulated in the form
The chosen speci…cation of expectations is crucial for understanding the model. It states that market expectations are based on the survey expectation v, but at the same time allow market expectations to be correlated with the actual outcome with some coe¢ cient .
Consider two extreme cases. Firstly, the case of = 0 captures the case when the survey expectation includes all available information in the market, as we then obtainṽ = v. Secondly, = 1 captures the case of perfect forecast abilities asṽ = . It therefore seems reasonable to impose the restriction of 0 < < 1.
The speci…cation however introduces the possibility of non-rationality in the expectation formation, asṽ may not be the conditional expectation.
Nonetheless, the speci…cation appear to be suited for capturing the market expectation as it seems to crudely capture the uncertainties related to the expectation formation process. The market expectation therefore appears to be a plausible approximation.
Finally we impose that aggregate supply should equal aggregate demand for the risky asset in a market clearing condition:
Theorem 1 Given the model above, there is a unique Bayesian linear equilibrium characterized by conditions:
where a = 1 ( +b 2 u+ ")
Proof. See appendix.
The theorem gives an explicit solution for the price dynamics at period t 1. This can be used to …nd the pricing dynamics after the announcement, i.e. at period t. To see this, note that (ii) from Theorem 1 can be re-written
Inserting this into (2) gives
Finally substitute this into (1) to obtain
This shows that the pricing dynamics following the announcement is determined by two factors. Firstly, there is an impact from the deviation from the survey expectation. Secondly, there is a component related to the updating of expectations, which is revealed through prices, but blurred by the noise trading shock.
The second term captures the market impact of informed investors, as prices change to re ‡ect the true market expectation. Hence, the superior forecasting skills of informed investors is disseminated into the prices. Subsequently market prices after announcement subsequently change according to the true market expectation and not the survey expectation.
The model has some testable implications, which will be considered in the following section. For this use, the following lemma is useful.
Lemma 2 For < 0 and 0 < < 1 then a > 0 and b < 0:
The assumption of < 0 in Lemma 2 is consistent with empirical observations from the bond market, as documented later in this paper. For instance a stronger-than-expected GDP report is likely to make market participants revise up their expectations for future growth and induce higher bond yields, thereby causing negative bond market returns. Combining Theorem 1, (ii), and Lemma 2 therefore tells us that, in absence of noise trading, a stronger than expected surprise, ( v) > 0, is associated with decreasing prices prior to release.
Consequently Lemma 2 implies that the second term in (5) is negative as a b < 0. Estimating a regression along the lines of (5) should therefore give a negative sign on the expectations adjustment term. The negative expectation adjustment term implies a negative relationship between prices after and before the announcement of , when adjusting for the impact of the surprise. This is done in the following section.
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A standard event study model build upon (5) is implemented using highfrequency futures contract data from US and euro area long-term bond markets. This enables us to examine with such an expectations adjustment does take place as predicted by the model. A negative and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the price change prior to release of a given macroeconomic announcement in a regression along the lines of (5) is consistent with the hypothesis of expectation adjustments. Furthermore, by including price movements prior to release in order to capture expectation adjustments, a market based measure of market expectations for upcoming macroeconomic releases can be derived from (4).
The theoretical model does however leave two important answers unsolved, even if the implications of the model is taken for face value. Firstly, the length of the intraday periods to be used are not indicated. In this paper the 5-minute return after release of the announcement and the 10-, 15-, 30-and 60-minute intervals prior to release is considered. The 5-minute interval after release has in previous studies, as for instance Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , been found to be adequate for measuring the market reaction.
The 10-, 15-, 30-and 60-minute interval prior to release captures the period in which private information is disseminated into prices. The considered intervals may be considered a relatively short window, however, using longer windows implies the risk of incorporating the impact from other events. Furthermore, it is plausible that only investors with superior information or forecasting skills, who are so to say, placing their bets on a speci…c outcome, are likely to trade shortly prior to announcement and the price impact is likely to be largest in this relatively short interval.
Put more directly, the choice of a return interval re ‡ects a trade-o¤. It is on the one hand very likely that some investors with private information have put on positions prior to the considered time interval, which is incorporated by increasing the return interval. On the other hand, by shortening the return interval, those investors actually putting on a position relatively close to release appear more likely to have private information and hence give a clearer signal. The chosen interval size is therefore a trade-o¤ between obtaining a clear signal and extracting most possible information.
Secondly, it must be kept in mind that it is a well-known fact in the literature, that high-frequency return series are negatively correlated. Roll (1984) demonstrates that the bid-ask bounce may induce this behavior.
Therefore, the negative sign on prior returns, as predicted by the model, may not only arise from the re-pricing of market expectations but also from the bid-ask bounce. The empirical implementation therefore has to disentangle the e¤ects from market microstructure noise and re-pricing of market expectations. In order to capture the bid-ask induced negative correlation and the re-pricing of market expectations, it appears appropriate to account for these two e¤ects in a simultaneous estimation.
In the …nal part of the paper, a market-based expectation measure is derived, based on the estimations of the event study model. Forecast errors of the market based expectation measure are compared with standard survey measures.
Data
Data from US and German bond markets are used, as bond market data appear to be most receptive to economic news. In principle, the data from the equity market and foreign exchange markets could be used as well. However, as regards the equity market, macroeconomic news may have an ambiguous e¤ect on equity prices and the impact of macroeconomic news may therefore not be obvious. For instance, a better-than-expected GDP report may, on the one hand, lead to more positive growth prospects for companies. On the other hand, this also induces higher in bond yields, which lowers the net present value of companies future cash ‡ows and increases the borrowing costs of companies. Similarly, but less restrictive, is the impact on foreign exchange markets, where some sort of ambiguity may also exist. A strong US number is likely to have the opposite e¤ect compared to a strong euro area release on the EURUSD exchange rate. As we consider announcements on US and German macroeconomic announcements, the analysis is restricted to bond markets.
We use bond market futures data, which has the fastest price discovery and most liquidity, see for instance Upper and Werner (2006) The macroeconomic data predominantly covers six US macroeconomic releases and two important German survey indicators, which is found to have importance for euro area bond market developments in Andersson, Overby, and Sebestyén (2006) . We use the following eight monthly macroeconomic announcements: US non-farm payroll, US CPI (MoM), US industrial production, US ISM manufacturing con…dence, US ISM non-manufacturing con…dence, US Retail Sales, GE IFO business sentiment indicator and GE ZEW indicator. 1 The announcement data, both the actual release and survey expectations, is collected from Bloomberg.
Testing for pre-announcement market reactions
The theoretical model implies that expectation adjustments should be tested in a regression of the form of (5), i.e.
where r t is returns after the announcement,r t 1 is returns before the announcement. is the announcement and v is the survey-based market expectation, i.e. v measures the surprise content of the announcement. Significance of the^ parameter hence indicate that some expectation adjustment does take place, as market movements prior to release has information content. It is not possible to identify the parameters of the theoretical model, hence we do not perform a structural estimation. Compared to the theoretical model, the^ parameter corresponds to b a, where we can only identify .
Estimating (6) The event study approach is more simplistic, but still accounts for structural patterns around release time on non-announcement days, for instance induced by market microstructure noise. The regressions are performed individually for each announcement for 4 di¤erent return intervals prior to release, i.e. 10-, 15-, 30-and 60-minute returns. The length of the return after release is, as earlier mentioned, kept constant at 5 minutes.
The conditional mean regression for each of the 8 macroeconomic announcements, denoted by k =CPI, Industrial Production, ISM manufacturing Survey, ISM non-manufacturing Survey Non Farm Payroll, Retail Sales, IFO and ZEW, is speci…ed as
where the 5-minute bond return after release 4 , r t , is regressed on a constant; the lagged N =10-, 15-, 30-and 60-minute returnr t 1 ; the return prior to announcements as D k is a dummy taking the value 1 when announcement k is released in order to account for expectation adjustments and the surprise k t v k t of the considered announcement.
It is well known that volatility in …nancial returns are time-varying and increases around macroeconomic announcements. To account for these effects, a conditional volatility equation is …tted as well. The conditional volatility equation is speci…ed with a GARCH(1,1) process amended with a 2 For adoptions of their approach, see for instance Andersson, Overby, and Sebestyén (2006) for an application on German bond market data, Sebestyén (2006) on money market announcements and Fatum and Pedersen (2007) for measuring the impact of interventions.
3 In order to exclude the impact from other announcements, days with other announcements than the 8 announcements considered in this paper are also removed. In addition, two days with FOMC intermeeting rate cuts are removed. 4 Returns are calculated from 1 minute before release to 4 minutes after release. This is to avoid discrepancies in the time measurement between the announcement and price data. dummy indicating whether an announcement took place. 
rt is the 5-minute return after release of the announcement,r t 1 is the N-minute return before release and (
is the surprise of the announcement. Full estimation results can be found in the appendix. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes signi…cance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Several features can be noted from Table 1 and 2. Most importantly, the results show that for some macroeconomic releases, we do observe a statistical signi…cant market adjustment prior to release. Hence the hypothesis of price movements signalling true market expectations appear to be well supported for some, but not all macroeconomic announcements.
There are signi…cantly negative EA k parameters for non-farm payroll and ISM Management and the German ZEW indicator in the regressions based on the US and German bond market data, and also for the IFO indicator in the German data. In addition, the coe¢ cients are generally negative, albeit insigni…cantly, for most other releases. All in all, …nancial prices therefore do exhibit signs of expectations adjustment prior to the release of macroeconomic releases.
The strongest signs of expectations adjustment appears in the 10-and 15-minute interval. The EA k coe¢ cients tend to decrease, when extending the event window, which appear to suggest that the closer the release is, the more likely the trades are to re ‡ect some information about the upcoming release. Extending the prior return window seems to decrease the releaserelated trading and introduces more noise.
Interestingly enough, the announcements that do exhibit signs of expectation adjustments, are the announcements for which market reactions, on average, tend to be the largest. 5 Hence it may be hypothesized that market participants only engage in active position taking around the announcements, which are likely to produce the largest price ‡uctuations, i.e. where the outcome of successful position taking is likely to lead to the biggest pro…ts. It therefore appears that the costs related to forming independent expectations, such as information search, has to exceed some minimum gain.
Finally and not surprisingly, the information contained in bond prices on German announcements appear to be largest in the German bond market.
However, the conclusion does not hold for US announcements. The information contained in US announcements, at least in terms of signi…cance, appear to be almost the same in the German bond market data. This probably re ‡ects the high importance of US announcements on German bond markets as discussed in Andersson, Overby, and Sebestyén (2006) .
Extracting expectations
At least for some announcements there appears to be adjustments to market expectations. Obviously the adjusted market expectations are not directly observable, but it is possible to extract a market-adjusted expectation measure.
5 Importance in the sense of largest market impact. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) and Andersson, Overby, and Sebestyén (2006) use standardized surprises, which allows a comparision of impact coe¢ cients. Table 4 : Hit ratio of the market-adjusted expectation and Bloomberg survey measures. The hit ratio is de…ned as the share of sucessful hits, i.e. better directional forecasts than the Bloomberg survey measure.
By re-arranging our conditional mean speci…cation (7) we obtain
which gives an estimator for the market-adjusted expectation for announce-
Note that this estimator corresponds to our theoretical estimate of the market-adjusted expectation,
is the empirical counterpart of a b in (4) and hence appears a natural estimator for actual market expectations.
To determine whether the market-based expectations measure, v k market , does a better job than the the standard Bloomberg survey expectations, the forecast error is calculated for both expectation measures. The forecast error is measured as the absolute forecast deviation for the n announcements, i.e.
for each of the k announcement types with n releases/observations using respectively v k t = v k market;t and v k t = v k t for the market-adjusted expectation and the Bloomberg survey. Table 3 show no convincing outperformance over the traditional Bloomberg survey measure. If there is any tendency in Table 3, then the forecast errors are either similar or even higher for most US announcements. Not even the variables, which came out signi…cant in our earlier test, exhibit any meaningful outperformance. Both the ISM Management Survey and the very important non-farm payroll release fare slightly worse. For the German releases, the market expectation measure fare slightly better, at least based on the German bond market data. However, the outperformance does not appear particularly notable. Therefore, at …rst glance, the information of the informed traders does not appear to be particularly valuable.
The forecast errors in
It should however be noted, that the objective of the market investor is not, perhaps a bit surprisingly, to obtain low forecast errors, but to make money. The investor is more concerned about getting the directionality in the surprise correctly, i.e. whether the given release was above or below consensus. As noted earlier a positive surprise is linked with negative returns and vice versa, at least for bond markets. Hence having made a larger forecast error is not important, as long as the investor captured whether the release was above or below consensus. In other words, the success or hit ratio for the forecast is of interest.
The hit ratio is measured as
The hit ratio consequently counts the total share of 'hits'or successful estimates of the market direction. A successful forecast in this sense is obtained when the market-adjusted expectation measure was higher or similar compared to the Bloomberg measure and the release actually surprised positively. Similarly when the expectation measure indicated a lower number and the release surprised negatively. The hit ratio is then de…ned as the number of hits out of the total number of announcements. The results of this is reported in Table 4 .
The results in Table 4 clearly show, that the hit-ratio is above 50 per cent in almost all cases. The forecast error may be higher, but the market on average gets the directionality of their forecast correctly. Therefore, as seen from the perspective of an investor, their forecasting skills are above average.
There is however one notable exception, namely the CPI release. The poor performance is however in line with a study by Beechey and Wright (2007) . They show that markets focus primarily on the rounded number for the CPI release, despite the availability of more precise information in the overall release -hence adding more information is not likely to improve estimates. Furthermore, the CPI has character of a binary variable due to the rounding. Consequently the rounding of the price indices appear to have introduced too much noise.
For the other announcements, it appears that the market-adjusted expectation measure often tend to under-or overshoot, even though the directionality more often is correct. Therefore market participants forecasting skills appear better than the Bloomberg measure, but that prices tends to under-or overshoot in the expectation adjustment phase prior to releases. Finally, the forecast errors of the market-adjusted expectation measure is not improved, but is does appear to be somewhat better at capturing the directionality of the surprise, i.e. whether the release surprises positively or negatively. Consequently, the market-adjusted measure does seem to outperform standard survey measures.
Proof of Theorem 1
We assume that the informed investors follow a linear strategy of the type X = ap t 1 + b(s i v). We then insert the linear strategy in the market clearing condition (3) and solve for p t 1 and obtain
where we have used that
This gives us (ii). Optimizing the investors CARA utility function with respect to x i , gives
We
Inserting the expression in (10) and the expression forp t 1 we obtain
In the …nal line we use Bayes formula. Then we substitute the expression forp t 1 and …nd that
Similarly we …nd that V ar[p t jp t 1 ] = + b 2 u + " .
Inserting these expressions into (11) gives us
This indicates directly that that b = 1 (1 ) " . It also follows that for > 0, 0 < < 1, < 0 and positive variance " > 0 we obtain b < 0.
In addition we get
which can be re-arranged to (using the expression for b)
Again noting that for > 0 and positive variances " ; ; u > 0, we obtain a > 0: The expressions of a and b gives us (i), which concludes the proof. Table 5 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the German Bunds futures contract using 10-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
where rt is the 5-minute return after release of the announcement,r t 1 is the 10-minute return before release and (
is the surprise of the announcement. The conditional volatility is speci…ed as a GARCH(1,1) augmented with a dummy indicating whether the announcement was released in this period, i.e. 2
hypothesis of expectations adjustments corresponds to a signi…cantly negative EA parameter. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes signi…cance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Table 6 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the US T-note futures contract using 10-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
hypothesis of expectations adjustments corresponds to a signi…cantly negative EA parameter. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes signi…cance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Table 7 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the German Bunds futures contract using 15-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
where rt is the 5-minute return after release of the announcement,r t 1 is the 15-minute return before release and (
hypothesis of expectations adjustments corresponds to a signi…cantly negative EA parameter. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes signi…cance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Table 8 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the US T-note futures contract using 15-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
hypothesis of expectations adjustments corresponds to a signi…cantly negative EA parameter. Bollerslev-Wooldridge robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes signi…cance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Table 9 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the German Bunds futures contract using 30-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
where rt is the 5-minute return after release of the announcement,r Table 10 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the US T-note futures contract using 30-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
where rt is the 5-minute return after release of the announcement,r Table 12 : Estimation results for 8 macroeconomic announcements on the US T-note futures contract using 60-minute prior return intervals. The conditional mean is for each announcement estimated as rt
where rt is the 5-minute return after release of the announcement,r parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes signi…cance at respectively the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
